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ENDING by commercial banks on the security of urban real estate
has for many years been a rather narrowly circumscribed activity
and, as will be seen from the accoUnt which this volume gives of the
development of the legal framework within which banks finance
real estate, they still operate under more severe limitations than
those affecting other institutional lenders. Nonetheless, commercial
banks play a many-sided and rapidly expanding role in the real estate
financing market. It is to the task of describing factually an impor-
tant aspect of this role—direct mortgage lending by banks for their
own account—that the present study is principally devoted. It may
be useful, however, in view of the limited scope of the study, to
indicate, so far as available information will permit, at least the gen-
eral nature and dimensions of the other real estate financing func-
tions that banks currently perform.
First, commercial banks play a prominent, possibly a dominant,
role in the short-term financing of building operations. In an in-
creasing proportion of cases the permanent mortgage financing is
supplied by the bank that extends the "construction loan," but most
frequently some other type of lender is looked to for these longer
term funds. This specialization of function results, of course, from
the predominantly short-term character of the liabilities of commer-
cial banks. Until recently there has been no information as to the
amount of this type of lending, but a survey by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation of the real estate financing activities of in-
sured commercial banks as of mid-1950 showed that of their $11.4
billion of nonfarm real estate loans about 7.5 percent—$840 million
—were of the construction loan type.
Commercial banks also participate in urban real estate financing
•by extending credit. to other financing agencies, such as mortgage
loan companies, that occupy an intermediate position between the•
12 URBANMORTGAGE FINANCING
mortgagor and the mortgagee supplying long-term, or so-called
"permanent," financing. These loans enable the intermediate financ-
ing agencies to hold inventories of mortgages for an interval—ordi-
narily not a long period—between their origination by the borrowing
company and their final lodgment with an institution prepared to
supply long-term, or so-called "permanent," financing. The FDIC
survey of insured commercial banks referred to above revealed that
in the $11.4 billion of nonfarm real estate loans held in mid-1950
about $400 million—around 3.5 percent—were of this type. Of these
credits to intermediary institutions only around $160 million, how-
ever, were actually secured by real estate.
While it might be concluded from these data that banks' hold-
ings of long-term mortgages for their own accounts clearly constitute
their most important real estate financing function, this is true only
with some qualification. Foi one thing; construction loans and those
extended to intermediate financing institutions have a relatively
rapid turnover; consequently, even their quantitative importance
relative to the volume of credit extended on a long-term mortgage
basis is not properly reflected by an outstandings figure.
Furthermore, construction lOans. are of crucial importance in the
real estate financing process in the sense that they are commonly
essential to the undertakIng of building projects, especially those of
large scope. The end result of these building operations is the crea-
tion of long-term mortgage debts which are absorbed by the institu-
tions supplying permanent financing. Thus the strategic role of
construction loans is far greater than is indicated merely by their out-
standing amounts at any one date.
In appraising the extent of the present study's coverage of bank
real estate financing as a whole it should also be noted that a signifi-
cant amount of the activity of banks in the mortgage market arises
from the exercise of their trust functions. Thus, many banks acquire
mortgages through their regular loan departments for trust invest-
ment, but since these do not appear among the reported assets of
banks they are excluded from the $11.4 billion of urban real estate
loans reported in the FDIC survey for mid-1950. Unfortunately
there are no data available on the amount of such investments, or
on their distribution among trust companies.
All of these urban real estate financing activities of commercial
banks are supplementary to their role as direct long-term investors.INTRODUCTION 3
They are excluded from consideration in the present Study in part
because of the inadequacy of information concerning them, but also
because a full discussion of them would have extended the scope of
the investigation beyond manageable limits. One may hope, how-
ever, that this monograph will be supplemented, at some not too dis-
tant date, by investigations of those aspects of bank real estate financ-
ing which it has left untouched.
Direct investment by banks in long-term real estate mortgages is
a subject of great importance, nonetheless, in view of the rapid in-
creases in commercial bank urban mortgage holdings which have
occurred since the end of World War II. The FDIC survey referred
to above showed that the' amount of urban real estate loans held by
insured commercial banks had increased by more than $6 billion
from mid-1946 to mid-1950. Furthermore, the importance of banks
in the urban mortgage market relative to other types of lenders has
increased markedly. Whereas commercial banks held approximately
one-twelfth of the mortgage debt on one- to four-family, nonfarm
homes in 1925, this ratio had increased to approximately one-sixth at
the end of 1949. The present study, by bringing together much of the
existing material pertaining to comnercial bank urban mortgage
lending, and presenting new primary data acquired through a sam-
pling of the urban mortgage loans held by 170 commercial banks as
of mid-1947, makes a considerable contribution to our knowledge
of the mortgage market generally, as well as of the direct mortgage
lending activities of commercial banks.
There is no need to give an accounting in this introduction of
the numerous sources from which materials have been drawn for this
study. However, in view of the extent to which the study depends on
information on a sample of mortgage loans made by 170 banks it may
be useful to comment briefly on the adequacy and representativeness
of this particular segment of the data. The problem of obtaining an
adequate sample of the loans of financial institutions is a formidable
one. Cooperation in this study, which was solicited on an entirely
voluntary basis, was not easily enlisted, in the main because the neces-
sary records on mortgage loans made in earlier years are either in-
adequate or inaccessible. Accordingly, a high rate of nonresponse
among the sampled banks was inevitable. The materials must be
used very carefully, therefore, in drawing inferences concerning the
lending practices of commercial, banks as a whole.4 URBAN MORTGAGE FINANCING
Apart from the difficultl of obtaining materials from existing
financial institutions, there is the further fact that a sampling of in-
stitutions undertaken at any time obviously cannot produce informa-
tion from failed institutions or from those that have terminated
operations for any other reason. A study based on the records of
surviving institutions—such a the present investigation—is inevita-
bly biased in the direction of relatively favorable investment experi-
ence. However, it is unlikely that this fact has substantially affected
the results of the study, since most bank failures were attributable to
losses on investments other than urban mortgage loans.
Confidence in the representativeness of the sample is strength-
ened to a considerable extent by the fact that nonresponse was least
among banks with the heaviest mortgage holdings: responding banks
constituted nearly 75 percent of all those with urban mortgage loan
portfolios of $8 million or over as of mid-1945, around 50 percent of
all those with mortgage holdings of from $4 to $8 million, though
only about 1 percent of the banks with mortgage portfolios of less
than $4 million. This heavy nonresponse among the small-portfolio
banks probably exerts only a minor influence On the representative-
ness of the findings since the great bulk of the urban mortgage lend-
ing of commercial banks is done by the largest banks—about 35 per-
cent in mid-1946 and 40 percent in mid-1950 by banks with deposits
of more than $100 million.
Nonetheless, in view of the questions which a high margin of non-
response necessarily raises concerning the representativeness of sur-
vey results, it may be of interest to compare the results of the bank
survey with the results of a companion study of the activities of life
insurance companies. Data were compiled for the latter on a high
proportion of all life insurance urban mortgage lending activity, and
the results are presumably more reliable. Accordingly, confidence
may be had in the results of the commercial bank study to the degree
that its results conform in general—with such nonconformity as
might be expected owing to institutional diffrences—with the re-
sults of the more comprehensive analysis of insurance company ac-
tivities. Also, at a number of important points the rçsults of the 1947
sample study of commercial banks can be compared with those base4
on a complete enumeration of the real estate loans of insured com-
mercial banks made by the FDIC in mid-1950. -
Surveyresults show, as indicated in the following tabulation, thatINTRODUCTION 5
considerably more than half of the amount of urban mortgage loans
held by commercial banks were secured by one- to four-family dwell-
ings. A smaller, but still appreciable, proportion of the loans held by
insurance companies were in this same category. There is reason to
believe, however, that the relatively high proportion of the amount
of loans on nonresidential properties held by responding commer-
cial banks is not altogether characteristic of commercial banks as a
whole, in view of the results of the mid-1950 FDIC survey. This may
•well be due to an oversampling of larger banks in the mid-1947 sur-
vey but another factor doubtless is a shift toward the financing of
larger income-producing properties which became evident in 1950.
Nevertheless the broad outlines of portfolio composition revealed
by the sample study are confirmed by the mid-1950 enumeration.
TABLE I —PERCENTAGEDIsTIUBuTI0N OF THE AMOUNT OF UiusMORT-
GAGE HOLDINGS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND COM-














1- to 4-family dwellings 44.0% 66.5% 71.4%
Other residential property 5.l 5.4 10.8
All other property 20.9 28.1 17.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
As would be expected, close conformity of results is found when
comparisons are drawn between the characteristics of insurance com-
pany loans secured by one- to four-family dwellings and those made
by commercial banks. In both cases the great bulk of loans is of rela-
tively small original amount—under $10,000. This characteristic of
the loan portfolios of banks is also revealed when those with large,
medium, and small portfolios are considered separately (cf. below,
Table 9, p. 42), though there is a somewhat greater concentration
of loans of less than $5,000 in the small portfolios. This suggests that
the relatively heavy nonresponse among the small-portfolio banks
may well have the effect of overstating the average size of home mort-
gage loans for commercial banks as a whole. However, this effect
could not have been very serious since the mid-1950 FDIC survey
showed. that, for banks as a whole, the average size of outstanding6 URBAN MORTGAGE FINANCING
loan balances secured by one- to four-family properties was approxi-
mately $3,600, whereas the mid-1947 commercial bank sample sur-
vey showed an average outstanding loan balance of $4,600. In view
of the increase that took place between 1947 and 1950 in home prices,
and thus in the average size of mortgage loans written, this result
appears to bear out the inference that the sample tends somewhat to
overstate average loan size, but suggests strongly that the overstate-
ment is not substantial.
TABLE II— PERCENTAGE DisnuBurIoN OF URBAN MORTGAGE HOLDINGS
OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL BANK BY


























Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Further evidence of broad similarity in the home financing poli-,
cies of commercial banks and insurance companies is apparent when
the samples for both are compared, as in the following tabulation,
with respect to the insured or noninsured status of the loans, their
repayment schedules, contract lengths and loan-to-value ratios.
Though both types of agencies appear to have about the same pro-
portion of their portfolios in loans made under federally-sponsored
programs, commercial banks have been relatively much more active
in making GI loans than have life insurance companies. This fact
may be due mainly to the essentially local character of bank lending,
but the sample, having been taken at a later date, also had a greater
chance to include GI loans than the sample for insurance companies.
The reliability of the commercial bank sample is attested again
by the results of the mid-1950 FDIC survey, according to which
about 57 percent of the outstanding amount of all bank loans on one-
to four-family properties were insured or guaranteed—27 percent in-
sured by FHA and 30 percent guaranteed by VA—compared withINTRODUCTION 7
TABLEHI —PERCENTAGEDISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING ON
ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY MORTGAGE LOANS OF LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKS BY TYPE OF LOAN AND
CONTRACT TERMS a
24 Leading Life 170 All Insured
Loan Insurance Companies, Commercial Banks, Commercial Banks,
Characteristics End of 1946 Mid-1947 Mid-1950
TYPE OF LOAN
Insured 53.2% 61.5% 57.5%
FHA 47.7 21.0 27.2
VA 5.5 40.5 30.3






Nonamortized 4.8 3.5 4.5
REPAYMENT SCHEDULE .
Monthly 89.7 90.1 ..
Quarterly 2.2 4.0 ..
Semiannually 2.6 1.7 ..
Annually .6 .5 •.
No schedule 4.8 3.5 ..
CONTRACT LENGTH b
.
0 —4years 9.8 16.1 ..
5—9 5.7 31.2 ..
10 —14 16.5 46.5 ..
15 and over 67.9 6.2 ..
LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIOb .
Under 40% 3.1 7.8 ..
40 —59 35.4 50.6 ..
60 —79 48.7 84.7
80 and over 12.1 6.5 ..
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
a Excludes a few loans for which data were not available.
b Includes noninsured loans only.
about 62 percent in the sample study. Approximately the same per-
centage of the conventional, i.e., noninsured and nonguaranteed,
loans of commercial banks and insurance companies were made on a
full-amortization basis. Around 5 percent of the sample of insurance
company conventional loans secured by one- to four-family proper-
ties were of the nonamortized type. About 4 percent of the amount
of commercial bank loan balances were of this type, according to the
1947 sample and, on the basis of the complete enumeration of mid-8 URBAN MORTGAGE FINANCING
1950, around 5 percent. The materials show, however, a distinct
tendency on the part of banks to be relatively conservative in their
conventional lending as regards the maturity of loan contracts and
the ratios of loan to value. This would be expected, of course, in view
of the more restrictive legal framework under which banks operate.
The liberalizing effect on home mortgage credit terms of the fed-
eral loan insurance and guarantee programs is brought out sharply
in the data which the sample surveys.provide on changes since 1920
in the average contract length and average loan-to-value ratios of the
loans made by banks and insurance companies. After 1934 the home
mortgage loans made by both commercial banks and insurance com-
panies carried considerably longer maturities and higher ratios of
original loan amount to value of property. These changes are shown
graphically in Chart 2 of the present study (page 51), which may be
compared with Chart 4 in the companion study of Urban Mortgage
Lending by Life Insurance Companies (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1950).
In view of the character of home financing, and of the competi-
tive nature of the home mortgage market, it is not surprising to find
that interest rates on urban mortgage loans of commercial banks
parallel closely those charged by insurance companies. This would
be expected, of course, on loans made under the federal loan insur-
ance and guarantee programs, but there is also a close similarity of
rates on. conventional loans.
TABLE IV —AVERAGECURRENT INTEREST RATES FOR URBAN MORTGAGE
LOANS ON ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY DWELLINGS HELD BY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKS, CLASSIFIED
BY TYPE OF LOAN
24 Leading Life 170
Type of Loan Insurance Companies,




VA 4.1% . 4.0%
FHA 4.5 , 4.5
Noninsured .
Fully amortized 4.6 4.9
Partially amortized 4.9 4.6
Nonamortized 4.9 . 4.7
Total. 4.5% 4.4%INTRODUCTION 9
Perhaps the most striking influence of the loan insurance pro-
grams on the home mortgage market has been the virtualelimina-
tion of regional differences in interest rates. In effect, the federal
programs have created a national pattern of mortgage rates, from
which there can be only relatively minor deviations, though regional
differences in the proportion of insured and guaranteed loans to
total home loans outstanding may result in some variation in average
interest rates for portfolios as a whole. This variation is somewhat
greater for banks than for insurance companies, which might be ex-
pected in view of the nationwide range of the lending operations of
the latter and the essentially local markets of most banks.
While it is instructive to compare similarities in the investment
experiences of commercial banks and insurance companies with re-
spect to urban mortgage loans, there are a number of reasons why
one would expect to find differences in the two records. In the first
place, the limitation of the commercial bank study to surviving insti-
tutions would tend, as indicated above, to produce a bias in the
direction of relatively favorable experience. Furthermore, it is likely
TABLE V —AVERAGECURRENT INTEREST RATES FOR URBAN MORTGAGE
LoANs ON ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY DWELLINGS HELD BY LIFE









All Noninsured All Noninsured
Loans Loans Loans Loans
New England 4.6% 4.5% 4.4% 4.5%
Middle Atlantic 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.5
East North Central 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.6
South Atlantic 4.5 4.7
4.5 4.5
4.4 4.7
East South Central 4.5 4.5
West North Central 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3
West South Central 4.5 4.7 44 4.7 b
Mountain 4.6 4.9 4.5 5.7 b
Pacific 4.5 4.6 4.4 5.1
United States 4.5% 4.6% 4.4% 4.8%
a For the states induded in each census region, see footnote b of Table 6, Chapter 3.
b Based on twelve loans for the West South Central region and- twenty for the
Mountain region. -10 URBAN MORTGAGE FINANCING
that the banking institutions able to provide information on samples
of loans, that is, the responding banks, would be the better organized
and better managed institutions and thus the institutions with the
better investment records. Finally, until the end of the twenties the
laws affecting commercial bank investment in mortgage loans were
so much more restrictive than those affecting insurance companies
that. one would expect banks as a whole to have a more favorable in-
vestment experience. On the other hand, all life insurance com-
panies survived the thirties, so that there is no survival bias and
there seems to be no basis for believing that the few noncooperating
insurance companies would have had a loss experience differing sig-
nificantly from that of the cooperating companies.
The, expectation that insurance company experience would be
less favorable than that shown by the sampled commercial banks is
borne out by a comparison of their foreclosure rates. When the loans
made by insurance companies and commercial banks on one- to four-
family dwellings over the period 1920—46 are classified according to'
the year in which they were originated and the percentage of the
loans in each year which eventually went to foreclosure, the com-
mercial bank experience—except for 193 and l937—is found to have
been consistently better than that of the life insurance companies.
For all types of properties combined, only 3.2 percent of the mort-
gage loans made by commercial banks over this period eventually
went to foreclosure while 8.2 percent of the loans 'made by insurance
companies were so terminated.
However, the relative severity of the foreclosure experience of
the two types of institutions in different periods was markedly simi-
lar. Thus, the percentage of loans going to foreclosure of those made
in the years 1925—29 was, in both cases, about four times as great as
the percentage going to foreclosure of those made in the period
1920—24. On the other hand, while the experience of commercial
banks on loans made in the period 1930—34 was considerably
better than their experience on loans made in the years 1920—29,
this was not true of the life insurance companies.
Despite the fact that the commercial banks for which loan ex-
perience information was available had a better foreclosure experi-
ence record over the years 1920—46 than the reporting insurance
companies, they seemed to do less well in the disposal of foreclosed
properties. Thus, the losses which commercial banks sustained onINTRODUCTION 11
foreclosed one- to four-family properties arising out of loans origi-
•nated in the period 1920—47 was 24 percent of the original amount
of the loans foreclosed, as compared with something less than 10
•percent for insurance companies. Similarly, the losses in percent of
original loan amount on loans secured by properties other than one-
to four-family dwellings were more than twice as high for commer-
cial banks (36.1 percent) as for insunince companies (13.4 percent).
However, it is interesting to observe that, for both types of institu-
tions, loss ratios were highest where the time-span between the origi-
nation of the loan and the period of the property's disposal was
greatest.
TABLE VI— FORECLOSURE RATES FOR URBAN MORTGAGE LOANS ON ONE-
TO FOUR-FAMILY DWELLINGS MADE BY LIFE INSURANCE



















1920 6.2% 2.1% 1935 3.4% .8%
1921 4.9 2.3 1936 2.5 •.0
1922 .3.2 2.0 1937 1.8 5.0
1923 7.9 2.5 1938 1.7 .0
1924 12.0 5.6 1939 .1.9 .1
1925 15.0 10.6 1940 .4 .0
1926 19.6 8.9 1941 .1 .0
1927 21.8 11.1 1942 .3 .0
1928 28.5 14.1 1943 .4 .0
1929 29.6 13.7 1944 .0 .0
1930 22.0 6.4 1945 .0 . .0




1934 5.2 .0 Total 9.3% 3.4%
a For a definition of foreclosure rate, see footnote aofTable 19, Chapter 4.
The insurance company and commercial bank samples again
show the same general pattern of experience, when gain or loss, ex-
pressed in percent of the original amount loaned; is studied accord-
ing to the characteristics of the loans involved. For both types of
institutions the loans made on one- to four-family dwellings on a12 .URBANMORTG'AGE FINANCING
nonamortized basis had a higher loss rate than those made on a
full- or even partial-amortization basis, though the differences are
considerably greater for commercial banks than for insurance com-
panies. Differences in experience according to the terms on vhich
the loans were made—i.e., contract 1ength, interest rates, and loan-
to-value ratios—are unsystematic in both cases.
A final measure of commercial bank and insurance company
experience in the field of mortgage investment is provided by a com-
parison of the contract interest rates and realized yields on loans of
different types, and by the "loss rate;" that is, the difference between
the contract rate and realized yield. General conformity is found to
exist between the two types of institutions in these respects. Loss
rates for both insurance companies and commercial banks were lower
on one- to four-family dwellings than on all other types of property
combined. Loss rates on one- to four-family loans made in different
periods were roughly similar for insurance companies and commer-
cial banks—being lowest on 'loans made in 1920—24 and highest on
those made in 1925—34—but the record is relatively uneven when
loss rates are studied by contract length and by loan-to-value ratios.
In'general, one would expect higher loss rates to be associated
with relatively high contract interest rates, that is,, for differences in
realized yields to be less than differences in contract rates. However,
this expectation is not borne Qut by the loan experience records of
either commercial banks or insurance companies. In the case of in-
surance company loans, little difference is found between the contract
interest rates on loans secured by one- to four-family properties and
those secured by "all other" properties, when loans of the same size
are compared. Yet the loss rates for any given size class of loans are
sometimes higher on those secured by one- to four-family properties,
sometimes higher on those secured by other properties. A particu-
larly notable fact is that the very largest apartment and nonresiden-
tial loans—those of $100,000 and over in original amount—had the
lowest contract interest rates of all size groups and in general the
highest loss rates. Roughly the same was found to be true in corn-
mercial bank experience. In the main, therefore, the facts suggest
that financial institutions failed to make adjustments in interest
rates sufficient to counterbalance ultimate differences in loss experi-
ence.INTRODUCTION. ' 13
Finally, we may contrast commercial banks and insurance com-
panies with respect to the costs of acquiring and servicing mortgage
loans. In this respect the information available for commercial banks
is very much less complete than the data on loan administration costs
for life insurance companies, yet the results arebroadly similar. The
gross income of commercial banks on their mortgage 'loan portfolios
—from 4.26 to 4.75 percent of average loan investment for the ma-
jority of banks—ranged somewhat higher than the gross income
earned by life insurance companies, but the closeness of the cost
ratios is particularly striking. For 1946 a limited group of banks
reported costs which averaged 1.35 percent of their average loan in-
vestment, whereas life insurance companies with the smaller loan
portfolios-—which would be the group most closely comparable in
scale of operations—reported an average cost of 1.17 percent. As a
result; the ratios of net income to average loan investment for com-
mercial banks and insurance companies with relatively small port-
folios as of 1947 are fairlyclose—in the neighborhood of 3 percent.
These comparisons of the characteristics of loans made by com-
mercial banks and insurance companies and of the investment expe-
rience of the two çypes of institutions tend, in general, to strengthen'
the confidence that may be placed in the sample data for banks. The
comparisons also point up the over-ruling fact that mortgage in-
vestment experience, over the period 1 920—47, varied only narrowly
from one type of institution to another. '
R.J.SAULNIER